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Abstract
Nearby friend discovery is a popular location based service (LBS), which allows you to discover nearby like-minded people, and
make friends with them. The main privacy threat of this service is that the disclosure of locations leaves opportunities for stalkers.
Although location privacy preservation in LBS has recently received much attention, few works have been done on privacy-aware
nearby friend discovery, where people want to discover nearby friends without exposing their private locations to arbitrary strangers.
Unlike most of other LBS services, nearby friend discovery needs to consider the privacy of both of the two communicating entities,
i.e., the user who is searching for nearby people, and the user who is being discovered by others. This unique property makes it a
great challenge to protect users’ location privacy while providing satisfactory service quality. This paper presents the ﬁrst research
addressing this issue by combining the location approximation technique and the homomorphic cryptography. We show that the
proposed scheme provides formal privacy guarantees for the LBS users, and still achieves satisfactory quality of the LBS.
c© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Elhadi M. Shakshuki.
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1. Introduction
The prevalence of mobile devices equipped with GPS has enabled the geo-social networks, which support varied
Location Based Services (LBS), to become increasingly popular. With the additional location information collected
by the LBS servers, geo-social networks could provide the LBS users with unique services that are absent in current
social networks. Nearby friend discovery is a popular LBS that is provided in many geo-social networks, such as
Loopt, WeChat, NearbyFeed, etc. It supports discovering the nearby like-minded people, getting familiar with them,
and making friends with them.
Just like many current LBS, nearby friend discovery also suﬀers from location information leakage, which may
easily result in the consequence that the LBS users being stalked by other users or by the untrusted LBS servers.
Current solutions for protecting the location privacy of the LBS users could be divided into two categories. They
are based respectively on location-approximation and k-anonymity. Location-approximation aims at providing quasi-
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indistinguishability within a certain area, by approximating the real location of the LBS user1,2. For example, if the
user is located in the Empire State Building, then from the point of view of the attacker, the user could be anywhere
within a certain radius from the Empire State Building. Since the reported location is not the exact location of the
user, the service quality will degrade to some extent. Instead of approximating the individual locations, k-anonymity
protects the identities of the LBS users by restricting that a user can query for a region such that at least k users of the
service are present within that region3. This means, it seems to the attacker that the request could come from any LBS
users who are around Empire State Building. Another method for achieving k-anonymity is to generate k − 1 dummy
points, and to send k queries to the LBS server4.
Although both of location-approximation and k-anonymity could preserve users’ location privacy for many LBS,
neither of them are appropriate for the nearby friend discovery service. First of all, for nearby friend discovery
service, identities of the users are necessary in order to ﬁnd the people in the neighborhood and get familiar with
them. Therefore, it is not practical to apply k-anonymity for this service. Second, unlike most other LBS services,
such as nearby interest point recommendation and nearby friend alert, nearby friend discovery needs to protect the
location privacy of both communicating entities instead of protecting that of only one entity, i.e., the user who is
searching for the nearby people, or the user who is being discovered by others. This characteristic will further degrade
the service quality when both users are using the approximate locations or k − 1 dummy points.
By introducing homomorphic cryptography5, some existing works6,7 have enabled LBS users with friendship to
compute their distances with each other. The end-to-end communications bypass the LBS servers, and hence the
users’ location information is kept private from the LBS servers. Inspired by these works, we propose to combine
the location-approximation technique with the homomorphic cryptography, to protect the privacy of the users in
nearby friend discovery service while still providing satisfactory service quality. Speciﬁcally, we adopt the location
cloaking function proposed by Andres et al. 8 to generate an approximate location with the formal privacy guarantee,
i.e. -geo-indistinguishability, for each user. For this research, we refer the approximate location providing the geo-
indistinguishability as anchor. As an example, when a user Alice intends to search for the people in her neighborhood,
she would generate an anchor and use the anchor to send her friend discovery request to the server. The LBS server
produces recommendations only based on the anchors reported by Alice and other users. To guarantee that all users
within Alice’s interested area can be included in the recommendation list, the LBS server would need to enlarge the
recommendation area, resulting in considerable redundancies in the recommendation list. We then propose a two-step
reﬁnement procedure, which will ﬁrstly make use of the relative positions of the recommended users with respect to
Alice’s anchor, and then takes advantage of the properties of the homomorphic cryptography, to properly reduce the
redundancy and enhance the service quality.
In Section 2, we introduce the related preliminaries, including diﬀerential privacy, geo-indistinguishability, and
homomorphic cryptography. In Section 3, we present the proposed scheme in more detail. In Section 4, we analyze
the security features of the proposed scheme and evaluate its performance. Conclusions are summarized in Section 5.
2. Preliminary
2.1. Diﬀerential Privacy
Diﬀerential privacy9 is a notion coming from statistical databases. A randomized function K gives -diﬀerential
privacy if for all data sets D1 and D2 diﬀering on at most one element, and all S ⊆ Range(K), we have
Pr[K(D1) ∈ S ] ≤ exp() × Pr[K(D2) ∈ S ]
A mechanism K with -diﬀerential privacy is able to guarantee that the outputs of the data set in terms of one
request will not become signiﬁcantly more likely or less likely, even if the participant removes his or her data from the
data set. This addresses the concern that any participant might have the leakage of his or her personal information.
2.2. Geo-Indistinguishability
Geo-indistinguishability is a variation of diﬀerential privacy proposed to provide a formal location privacy protec-
tion for the LBS users. The geo-indistinguishability deﬁnition is given as follows8.
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A mechanism satisﬁes -geo-indistinguishability iﬀ for all observations S ⊆ Z, where x, x′ are respectively the real
location and the approximate location, and Z is the range of x and x′, we have
P(S |x)
P(S |x′) ≤ e
r (r = d(x, x′))
To satisfy -geo-indistinguishability, the user whose real location is x ∈ Z should generate a cloaking location
x′ ∈ Z, which can be drawn from the following noise function,
Dε(r, θ) =
ε2
2π
re−εr
In this planar Laplace distribution, r and θ are the distance and the angle with respect to x, respectively. Speciﬁcally,
the angle θ could be uniformly chosen from [0, 2π), and the radius r could be set as C−1 (z), where C(z) = 1 − (1 +
z)e−z, and z is uniformly chosen from (0, 1).
2.3. Paillier Cryptosystem
Paillier cryptosystem10 is an asymmetric algorithm for public key cryptography. It is composed of three algorithms
as follows.
KeyGenerate: The user randomly selects two large prime numbers p and q with the same length. Then the user
computes n = pq and λ = (p − 1)(q − 1). Next, the user sets g = (n + 1) and μ = (λ mod n2)−1 mod n. The encryption
key is EK = (n, g) and the decryption key is DK = (λ, μ).
Encrypt: The user achieves encryption by choosing a random integer r ∈ Zn and computing the ciphertext
E(m, r) = gm · rn mod n2.
Decrypt: The holder of DK = (λ, μ) recovers the message m = L((E(m, r))λ mod n2) · μ mod n, where L(a) =
(a − 1)/n mod n.
Paillier cryptosystem is also an additive homomorphic cryptosystem, with the properties that, for anym1,m2, r1, r2 ∈
ZN , the following two equations hold.
E(m1, r1) · E(m2, r2) = E(m1 + m2, r1r2) mod N2
E(m1, r1)m2 = E(m1m2, r
m2
1 ) mod N
2
3. The Proposed Scheme
The proposed scheme contains three steps: (1) nearby friend discovery request, (2) friend recommendation, and
(3) recommendation list reﬁnement.
3.1. Nearby Friend Discovery Request
Suppose that a user A, whose real location in the Cartesian reference system is (xA, yA), wants to search nearby
friends in the neighborhood R, which is a region centered at (xA, yA) with the radius of d. To protect the location
privacy, A would report his anchor, instead of his real location to the LBS server. The anchor point ALA = (xA′ , yA′ )
could be drawn from the planar Laplace distribution introduced in Section 2.2. That is, xA′ = xA + rcosθ, yA′ =
yA + rsinθ, where r = 11−(1+z)e−z (z ∈ (0, 1)), and θ ∈ [0, 2π). Note that when z approaches 0, r approaches inﬁnity,
which means the LBS server would make inﬁnite many recommendations. This is rather unreasonable in the case of
nearby friend discovery. Therefore, in this paper, we restrict the range of r, which means, instead of allowing it to
grow into inﬁnity, we set it to be no more than d. Hence, we need to uniformly choose z ∈ [threshold, 1) to generate
r. The threshold can be easily obtained given a speciﬁc  and d.
Since the LBS server makes recommendations according to the anchors, we let each LBS user compute his or her
angle with respect to his or her anchor. For instance, user A’s angle is θA = (θ + π) mod (2π). Then, user A generates
the encryption key EKA = (n, g) and the decryption key DKA = (λ, μ) in Paillier’s cryptosystem. The following
cyphertexts are generated using EKA.
EA = {EA(−θA), EA(1)}
The ciphertexts, along with the user’s identity, location of the anchor, and current time stamp, are packed as the
request message and forwarded to the LBS server.
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Fig. 1. Nearby friend discovery: requesting and responding
3.2. Friend Recommendation
We assume that the LBS server holds a registration list, storing the information of the service users, including the
user identities, anchor points, ciphertexts, as well as the time stamps indicating the time when the friend requests were
sent. The time stamp is used to restrict the behavior of the LBS users, so that a user in the registration list would be
removed when the current time exceeds the corresponding time stamp plus a preset threshold. At the same time, a
user is not allowed to send a new request before he or she is removed from the list. This is important to prevent the
inﬁnite growth of the registration list, as well as to guarantee the eﬀectiveness of the recommendation, especially in
the mobile environment where the users experience high mobility. Besides, time stamp information can also be used
to carry out the proposed recommendation procedure, which will be discussed later.
Upon receiving the request from the user A, the LBS server ﬁrst adds the request message into the registration list.
Then, it searches in the list to ﬁnd the users whose anchors are located within the region RA that is centered at ALA.
For this paper, we assume that the radius of the interested region for each user is the same. Therefore, to guarantee
R to be totally included, without the knowledge of user A’s real location, the radius of RA should be 3d. The users
located in RA are then added into the recommended friend set F. For each user j in F, the server further computes his
or her anchor’s position with respect to ALA in the polar system, i.e., (r′j, θ
′
j). This information as well as the identity
information and E j are then forwarded to user A as the recommendation list.
The procedure for the nearby friend discovery requesting and responding is shown in Figure 1. Note that, when
there is another user who is in the neighborhood of A sending friend request to the LBS server, user A’s information
will be forwarded to this user. However, for the users whose time stamp is earlier than that of A, they will not receive
user A’s information from the LBS server.
3.3. Recommendation List Reﬁnement
Although the potential nearby friends in region R would be deﬁnitely included in F, the service quality is not
satisfactory due to the considerable redundancy resulting from enlarged radius of 3d. In this research, we propose to
use the redundancy ratio to measure such a service quality, and adopt the following deﬁnition of the redundancy ratio.
Redundancy Ratio =
number of the redundant nodes
number of the expected nodes
If we assume that all of the LBS users are uniformly distributed, then the redundancy ratio could also be deﬁned as
Redundancy Ratio =
area of the redundant region
area of the expected region
We can see that the redundancy ratio of the recommendation set F provided by the LBS server will be as high as
eight, since the radius of the recommendation region is three times of that of the expected area. To enhance the
service quality, we propose a two-step reﬁnement procedure to reduce the redundancy ratio.
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3.3.1. Step 1: Shrinking
The ﬁrst step to reﬁne F is to shrink the area of the recommendation region based on the information of (r′i , θ
′
i )|i ∈ F.
The two parameters used for the shrinking procedure are respectively α1 and α2, as shown in Figure 2. Speciﬁcally,
α1 = θA − arccos r4d mod 2π, α2 = θA + arccos r4d mod 2π. Then user A shall perform Algorithm 1 as shown below.
Algorithm 1 Shrinking Based Reﬁnement
Input: α1, α2, F, Output: Reﬁned F
for All user i in F do
if (θ′i ∈ {(0,min(α1, α2))
⋃
(max(α1, α2), 2π)} and r′i > 2d) or (θ′i ∈ (min(α1, α2),max(α1, α2)) and r′i > 2d + r)
then
Remove user i from F
end if
end for
return F
After this step, the area of the region RA would be reduced to RA′, with the area of
S RA′ = π(3d)2 − arccos( r4d ) · ((3d)
2 − (2d + r)2) − (π − arccos( r
4d
)) · ((3d)2 − (2d)2)
= 4πd2 + arccos(
r
4d
) · (4dr + r2)
Since the area of the recommended region is reduced, the redundancy ratio will also be reduced, which is equal to
Redundancy Ratio′ =
S RA′ − S R
S R
= (3 ∼ 5.1)
3.3.2. Step 2: Homomorphic Encryption
To further reﬁne F, we propose to make use of homomorphic encryption, based on the Paillier ciphertexts of the
users in F. Speciﬁcally, user A shall perform Algorithm 2 as shown below.
Note that, only user j who holds the corresponding Paillier decryption key could obtain γ jA − θ j in plaintext.
Therefore, to carry out the reﬁnement, user A needs to forward E j(γ
j
A − θ j) to user j. Upon receiving the request from
user A, user j decrypts the message and compares |γ jA − θ j| with π2 . If |γ jA − θi| > π2 , it means that the distance between
user j and user A must be greater than d, since we have d(A, j) > d(A, ALi) and d(A, ALi) > d, as shown in Figure
2. In this case, user j gives A a negative response. User A then removes user j from F. Otherwise, user j gives A
a positive response. User A would keep user j in F. After carrying out the Algorithm 2, the area of the region RA′′
where all the users in the output F1 are located in would become:
S RA′′ = S RA′ − (π(d + r)
2
2
+
πd2
2
) = 3πd2 − πdr − πr
2
2
+ arccos(
r
4d
) · (4dr + r2)
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Algorithm 2 Homomorphic Encryption Based Reﬁnement
Input: The output F of Algorithm 1, Output: Reﬁned F
F1 = F
for All user i in F1 do
if (|θ′i − θA| < π2 and r′i ≤ d + r) or (|θ′i − θA| ≥ π2 and r′i ≤ d) then
Remove user i from F1
end if
end for
for All user j in F1 do
A calculates: γ jA with respect to ALj, based on the cosine theorem;
E j(1)γ
j
A = E j(γ
j
A); E j(−θ j) · E j(γ jA) = E j(γ jA − θ j).
if |γ jA − θ j| > π2 then
Remove user j from F
end if
end for
return F
In Algorithm 2, we show that if |γ jA − θ j| > π2 , we will remove j from F. Note that with respect to the anchor, the
probability density function (pdf) of the user’s real location is also a Laplacian distribution. Hence, the probability
of |γ jA − θ j| > π2 is 12 . The area of RA′′ could be accordingly shrunk by half. Then we shall obtain the refreshed
redundancy ratio as:
Redundancy Ratio′′ = Redundancy Ratio′ − S RA′′
2S R
= (1.5 ∼ 3.3)
4. Analysis on the Proposed Scheme
In this section, we evaluate the proposed scheme in terms of its performance in privacy as well as in eﬃciency.
4.1. Privacy Analysis
The proposed scheme contains three steps, i.e., nearby friend discovery requesting, friend recommendation, and
friend list reﬁnement. The involved entities include the LBS server, the user who sends the friend request to the LBS
server, and the user who responds to other user’s reﬁnement request. For the simplicity of presentation, we refer the
three entities as user A, server, and user B, respectively.
The entities involved in the ﬁrst step are user A and the server. Therefore, we consider to protect the location privacy
of user A from the LBS server in this step. Since the anchor of user A is generated following the way that satisﬁes
the -geo-indistinguishability in the region R, the location privacy of user A could be preserved in R. Please refer the
proof in [8] for details. Note that it is possible for the server to deliberately store and associate multiple messages sent
by user A to ﬁgure out his real location if user A sends multiple requests using diﬀerent anchors generated from the
same location. However, this threat could be released in the mobile environment, where users are usually having high
mobility, and hence will not always stay in the same location.
In the second step, since the server makes recommendation only based on the anchor information provided by
the LBS users, the location privacy of the LBS users in the registration list, including user B, still enjoy the -geo-
indistinguishability in their corresponding regions.
The third step contains two reﬁnement algorithms. First, since shrinking based reﬁnement is only the operation on
the side of user A, without involving other entities, the privacy of user A will not be degraded at all. That is, user A
still enjoys -geo-indistinguishability to the attackers. To further reﬁne the recommended friend set F, user A needs to
calculate his or her relative angle with respect to the anchor of user B. The angle could be further obtained by user B
through Paillier decryption. In this case, user A could be located by user B on a segment L, which starts at the anchor
of B with the length of 3d. As mentioned in Section 3, if B is in the recommendation list of A, B does not have the
information about A’s anchor. In this case, the probability distribution of A could be treated as the uniform distribution
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on L. We can show that A still is able to enjoy a -geo-indistinguishability with a small  in this case. Consider two
points X, Y on the segment L, their distance is Δr. Given the observation set S , we have
P(S |Y)
P(S |X) =
1/3d
1/3d
= 1
To satisfy the -geo-indistinguishability, we have
P(S |Y)
P(S |X) = e
Δr =⇒  = 0
Therefore, in this case, user A always enjoys -geo-indistinguishability on L.
Although we make use of time stamp to restrict the behavior of B in terms of obtaining A’s anchor location, B could
still send another friend discovery request after he is deleted from the registered list. With the additional information
of A’s anchor, B could locate A on L′, whose length varies from zero to 2d, depending on the relative position of A and
B. Since the anchor is generated by A following the Laplacian distribution in R2, A’s position could also be treated
as a Laplacian distribution in R2 with respect to the anchor ALA. If we treat the location of ALA as the origin, then
according to [8], the pdf of A’s position could be represented as
p(A(xA, yA)) = ρ()e−
√
x2A+y
2
A
ρ() is a normalization factor to keep the integral of the pdf function in the region R to be 1. If A could be located on
L’ by B, without loss of generality, the pdf of A’s position could be treated as p(A(xA, yA)) with a ﬁxed x0 or y0, which
is, for instance,
p′(A(xA, y0)) = ρ′(, xA)e−
√
x2A+y
2
0
ρ′(, xA) is a normalization factor to keep the integral of the pdf function over the whole L′ to be 1. With this pdf
function, A may not be proved to enjoy -geo-indistinguishability, except when L′ approaches to ALA, since in this
case A’s distribution conforms to a linear Laplacian distribution. The two cases in terms of user A’s privacy in step-2
reﬁnement are shown in Figure 3.
Now we consider the privacy of B. When receiving the response from B, A could know whether their angle
diﬀerence with respect to B’s anchor exceeds π2 . This information will determine whether or not the area of the region
where B enjoys the -geo-indistinguishability can be reduced by half. However, since the shape of the pdf of B still
conforms to polar Laplacian distribution in the new region, B still satisﬁes -geo-indistinguishability in the region
with the area of R/2. In a recently developed scheme6, B’s privacy will be degraded due to passively responding to
the other user’s distance request. However, in this scheme, we ensure that B has high chance to enjoy the same degree
of privacy in the proposed scheme. On one hand, under the model of the proposed scheme, we can reasonably assume
that A will not keep changing the anchor point in order to precisely locate others. Otherwise, A will expose his or
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her own location to everyone. On the other hand, even A does not care about his or her own location privacy, it is
not guaranteed that B will be in A’s recommendation list, since neither anchor location nor the time stamp remains
unchanged. Formal investigation about this point will be one of our further works.
4.2. Computation Overhead
The main computation cost of the proposed scheme comes from Paillier encryption and decryption, as well as the
relative position calculations in polar system. Since Paillier library for smart phone is unavailable currently, we im-
plemented our proposed scheme on laptop HP520 (Intel Core Duo 1.6GHz), which has the comparable computational
power as the popular smart phones. Adopting 1024-bit Paillier cryptosystem, and use the 32-bit int type to represent
a polar coordinate, the encryption time is 188ms, the decryption time is 374ms, the exponential operation and the
relative position calculation is much more lightweight, with the average time of no more than 1ms. In each nearby
friend discovery service, for user A, the total cost depends on the number of the users in the output F1 of Algorithm
2, i.e., N1, which could be approximated as (188 × N1)ms. For user B, the total cost would be 374ms, since the only
involved computation is the Paillier decryption. For the LBS server, only relative position calculations are involved.
Therefore, the total cost would be O(M), where M is the number of the users in the registration list.
4.3. Communication Overhead
By adopting 1024-bit Paillier cryptosystem, the size of the nearby friend discovery request sent by user A to the
server would be 2×1024+ length(ID)+ length(timestamp)+2× size(Cartesian coordinate). The size of the response
sent by the server would be N2 × (2 × 1024 + length(ID) + 2 × size(polar coordinate)), where N2 is the number of
the users in the unreﬁned F. In the friend list reﬁnement stage, user A needs to return E j to each user j in the output
F1 of Algorithm 2, the relative cost would be 2 × 1024 × N1. Generally, the total communication cost for each nearby
friend discovery service is proportional to the number of the users in the neighborhood of a user.
5. Conclusion
We have presented in this paper a strategy that addresses the privacy-aware nearby friend discovery issue. In
the proposed scheme, the LBS server makes friend recommendation according to the anchors, which provide geo-
indistinguishability for the LBS users within a speciﬁc region, instead of the real locations of the users. Then we
propose a two-step reﬁnement procedure to remove the redundant recommendations out of the recommendation list,
and hence improve the service quality. We show that the LBS users still enjoy -geo-indistinguishability in a speciﬁc
region after the reﬁnement. Furthermore, we have also carried out the analysis on the proposed system with regard to
both computational overhead and communication overhead.
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